Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

Utah v. Jefferey Ray Chatwin : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Heather Johnson; John O\'Connell; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for Appellant.
Jeffery S. Gray, Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General; James M. Cope;
Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Jefferey Chatwin, No. 20010060 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3106

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,

Case No. 20010060-CA

vs.
Priority No. 2

JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5103 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
PRESIDING
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
HEATHER JOHNSON
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR.
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

JAMES M. COPE
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office
231 East 400 South, Ste. 30
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee
I

I l t * j L a w mmmJ

Utah Court of App8a!c
MAR 1 3 2022
n«..lftHo Otartn

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20010060-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5103 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK
PRESIDING
JEFFREY S. GRAY, Bar No. 5852
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Bar No. 4666
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
HEATHERJOHNSON
JOHN O'CONNELL, JR.
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

JAMES M. COPE
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office
231 East 400 South, Ste. 30
Salt Lake Citv, UT 84111

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

-ji

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

riih

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

i

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

Summary of Proceedings Below

2

Summary of Facts

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT

5

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO
THE PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY STRIKE OF JUROR 11

5

A. Equal Protection Limits on the Use of Peremptory Challenges

5

B. Equal Protection Analysis for Peremptory Strikes

6

1. Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Purposeful Discrimination

Z

2. Offering a Neutral Explanation for the Peremptory Strike

8

3.

2

Proving Purposeful Discnmination

C. The Peremptory Strike of Juror 11 Was Not Discriminatory
1. Defendant Did Not Establish a Prima Facie Case of Purposeful
Discnmination

-i-

j_0

J_L

2.

The Prosecutor Offered a Neutral Explanation for Stnk.ns Juror
11

3.

The Tnal Court Properly Found that the Prosecutor's Reason for
Stnking Juror 11 Was Not Purposefully Discnminatory

CONCLUSION
ADDENDA
Addendum A (partial transcript)
Addendum B (jury list)

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE AUTHORITY
FEDERAL CASES

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986)

5-9. J_2., 13

Coopenvood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.), cert, denied,
— U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 228 (2001)

6

J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419(1994)
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995) {per curiam)
United States v. Tokars, 95 F.3d 1520 (11th Cir. 1996), cert, denied,
520 U.S. 1132, 117 S.Ct. 1282(1997)

5-8, U-18
6, 8-K)

16

STATE CASES

Gattis v. Delaware, 697 A.2d 1174 (Del. 1997), cert, denied,
522 U.S. 1124, 118 S.Ct. 1070(1998)

16

People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246 (111.), cert, denied,
— U.S. —, 122 S.Ct. 134 (2001)

16,12

State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah 1994)

7, 8

State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1997)

9-12,12

State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, 440 Utah Adv. Rep 7

2, 8, JO, 12

State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1988)

. . . 7, 9. U}

State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177 . . . '

5. 7.12

State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, 994 P.2d 1243

12

State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991)

-in-

Z

State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996)

2, 6. 9.12. W

State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92

3

State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
862P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993)

'.'... 6

State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1996)
State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)
State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 989 P.2d 503

U

1,5
6-8

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
STATUTES

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999)

i

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996)

i

Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-5 (1996)

19

Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-5 (Supp. 2002)

19

RULES AND REGULATIONS

Utah R. Crim. P. 17

19

Utah R. Crim. P. 18

1R

-IV-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20010060-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 2

JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for aggravated assault, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). This Court has junsdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The sole issue on appeal is whether the tnal court correctly denied defendant's
objection to the prosecutor's fourth and final peremptory stnke as an unconstitutional stnke
based on gender.
Standard of Review. "The tnal court's conclusion as to whether or not a pnma facie
case v\ as established is a legal determination . . . rev iew[ed] for correctness, according it no
particular deference." State v Pharris, 846 P 2d 454, 459 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 857
P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). However, the tnal court's determination as to whether the opponent

1

of the peremptory stake has proved purposeful discrimination "generally turns on the
credibility of the proponent of the stake and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous "
State v Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996); accord State v Cannon, 2002 LT
App 18, «[ 5, 440 Utah Adv. Rep 7.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause is relev ant to
this case, but a determination of the issues does not turn on the amendment's language
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SLMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault and two counts of
domestic violence in the presence ofa child, all third degree felonies. R. 1-3. Following a
preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for trial on aggravated assault, but both
counts ofdomestic violence in the presence ofa child were dismissed. SeeR. 19-20.1 A jury
convicted defendant as charged. R. 41-42, 74. After receiving a presentence investigation
report, the trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five
years, but suspended imposition of the sentence and place defendant on supervised probation
for one year. R. 82-84. Defendant timely appealed. R 85. Since the filing of defendant's

l

The results of the preliminary hearing are found only in the court docket fastened
to the record at R. 16-20. No minutes of the preliminary hearing are found in the record
i

appeal, the tnal court revoked defendant's probation and imposed the indeterminate prison
term.2
SUMMARY OF FACTS 3

On the evening of June 13, 2000, Brenda Lee was at the home of her boyfriend,
defendant. R. 101:38, 102. Lee was living with defendant at the time but was in the process
of moving to her mother's house. R. 101: 55-56. Lee and defendant were both drinking
heavily and using methamphetamine that night. R. 101: 40, 41, 54. Eventually, the two
began to argue. See R. 101: 39, 41, 52, 54, 80, 100. Lee decided to leave and packed all of
her belongings with the intention of walking to her mother's house. R. 101: 41, 42, 80.
Defendant followed Lee into the front yard and the two of them continued to fight. R. 101:
49, 63, 75. After arguing with defendant for several hours, Lee began walking down the
street toward her IIK ther's house. R. 101: 49,63. Defendant followed her for a time on foot,
"[h]ollering and screaming" at her, but then returned to the house. R. 101: 43.
After returning to his house, defendant got into his truck and resumed his pursuit of
Lee. R. 101:43. As Brenda stood on the sidewalk in front of a 7-Eleven, defendant pulled
his truck into the driveway four feet from Brenda, blocking her path. R. 101: 44, 67, 80.
Through his open window, defendant told Brenda to get into the truck. R. 101: 44, 66.

:

The signed minute entry revoking defendant's probation and imposing the prison
term is found on the first two pages of the court record. However, the tnal court clerk did
not index those pages and the several others that follow.
^Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to
the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT "6, «| 2, 12 P.3d 92.

Brenda refused but instead attempted to cross behind him R 101 45, 58, 80 AJ> Brenda
stepped off the curb, however, defendant put his truck in reverse and accelerated into her
knocking her back six to nine feet into the middle of the street R 101 66 As several
bystanders rushed over to help her, defendant drove off. R 101 66 As he did so, he yelled
out of the car window, "[Tjhat's what she gets " R 101 66.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant contends that the tnal court erred in denying his objection to the
prosecutor's peremptory strike of Juror 11, Amador Romero The tnal court's decision
should be affirmed for sev eral reasons. First, defendant failed to make a pnma facie show mg
of discnmination. In finding that Juror 11 was a minonty, it relied solely on the fact that he
had an Hispanic name. That is not enough. Nor is it enough to show that the prospective
juror was a minonty as the tnal court assumed. This Court should therefore affirm on the
alternative ground that because defendant failed to establish a pnma facie case of
discnmination, he should not have been required to proffer an explanation.
Second, the prosecutor did not exercise his peremptory stnke in a discnminatory
manner on the basis of gender. The prosecutor did not base his peremptory challenges on any
stereotype or assumption that women would be more likely to convict defendant or that men
were less qualified to consider a matter of domestic violence against women Rather, he
simply attempted to achieve a gender-balanced jury Had no peremptory challenges been
exercised, the jury would hav e consisted of 6 men and 2 women The prosecutor simply used
his stnkes in a manner that would achieve a more balanced jury
4

Accordingly, the

prosecutor's strikes did not violate the pnnciples of equal protection, but in fact furthered
them. A review of the record supports the prosecutor's explanation.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION
TO THE PROSECUTOR'S PEREMPTORY STRIKE OF JUROR 11
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his objection to the prosecutor's
peremptory stnke of prospective juror number eleven, Amador Romero ("Juror 11"). For the
reasons explained below, defendant's claim fails.
A. Equal Protection Limits on the Use of Peremptory Challenges.
"Ordinarily, prosecutors have the freedom to base peremptory challenges on any
reasons related to their views of the outcome of the case to be tried." State v Pharris. 846
P.2d 454,462 (Utah App.),cerf. denied, 857 P.2d948 (Utah 1993). However, that privilege
"is subject to the commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Batson v Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1719 (1986). Thus, "parties in a criminal action are prohibited from
engaging m purposeful racial discrimination in exercising peremptory challenges of potential
jurors." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996) (citing Batson, 4~6 U S at
90, 106 S.Ct. at 1719)); accord State v CoUelL 2000 UT 8,<j 14, 994 P.2d 177. Likewise,
"the Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination injury selection on the basis of gender,
or on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other
than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to be a man." JE B \

Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994); accord State v. Shepherd, 1999
LT App 305,«[ 28, 989 P.2d 503.
''Discrimination injury selection, whether based on race or on gender, causes harm
to the litigants, the community, and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from
participation in the judicial process." /.£.&, 511 U.S. at 140, 114 S.Ct. at 1427. As a result,
'"if purposeful discrimination is ultimately found, reversal of the defendant's conviction is
mandated, without regard to the harmlessness of the constitutional error." State v. MaciaL
854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App.) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 100, 106 S.Ct. at 1721), cert.
denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993).
B. Equal Protection Analysis for Peremptory Strikes,
Under Batson and its progeny, trial courts engage in a three-step analysis for
determining whether a party challenging a peremptory strike has demonstrated an equal
protection violation:
[0]nce the opponent of a peremptory strike has made out a prima facie
case of [ ] discrimination, (step one), the burden of production shifts to the
proponent of the strike to come forward with a [neutral] explanation (step
two). If a [neutral] explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide
(step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful [ ]
discrimination.
Purkettv.Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995) (per curiam) (applying
the analysis to race-based claims); accord, J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 144-45, 114 S.Ct. at 1429-30;
Coopenvood v. Cambra, 245 F.3d 1042, 1045-46 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, — U.S. —, 122
S.Ct. 228 (2001); Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 547.

6

1.

Establishing a Prima Facie Case of Purposeful Discrimination.

Under the first step of the analysis, the party opposing the strike "must make out a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts
gives nse to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94, 106 S.Ct.
at 1721; accord J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45, 114 S.Ct. at 1429-30; CohvelL 2000 UT 8, at «f
18. The purpose behind this first step is "to 'separate meritless claims of discrimination from
those that have merit."' State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1994) (quoting United
States v. Malindez, 962 F.2d 332, 334 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 875, 113 S.Ct. 215
(1992)). This step "requires more than simply showing that one or more minontyjurors were
peremptorily stricken." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 777 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); accord Colwell, 2000 UT 8, at^ 18. "[A]s a general rule, a 'defendant
who requests a prima facie finding of purposeful discrimination is obligated to develop
[some] record beyond numbers, in support of the asserted violation.'" Alvarez, 872 P.2d at
457 (quoting United States v. Brown, 941 P.2d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 1991)); Cohvell, 2000 UT
8, at 1f 18. And "[w]hile numerical evidence alone may be sufficient to establish a pattern
of peremptory strikes against minority jurors, numerical evidence alone does not necessarily
establish a prima facie case." Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, at <f 30.
In addition to demonstrating that the excluded panel members "belong to a cognizable
group," the opponent of the strike must show "that there exists 'a strong likelihood that such
persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any
specific b\zs."\4lvarez, 872 P.2d at 456 (quoting State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah

1988)); accord Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, at«[ 29. 'To satisfy this burden, the opponent
of the stnke must create a record establishing sufficient evidence to support the allegation
of purposeflil [ ] discrimination." State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, If 8,440 Utah Adv. Rep
7. In making this determination, the trial court "must undertake a' factual inquiry' that w takes
into account all possible explanatory factors1 in the particular case." Batson, 476 U.S. at 995,
106 S.Ct. at 1722. For example, "a 'pattern' of strikes against [minority] jurors might give
rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements
during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or refute an
inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; accord
Alvarez, 872 P.2d at 455.
2.

Offering a Neutral Explanation for the Peremptory Strike.

Once the opponent of the strike makes a prima facie showing, the proponent "must
articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." Batson, 476 U.S.
at 97-88, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24; accord J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144-45,114 S.Ct. at 1429-30. The
proponent of a strike cannot satisfy step two "by merely denying that he had a discriminatory
motive or by merely affirming his good faith." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771.
On the other hand, this second step "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or
even plausible." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 97,
106 S.Ct. at 172 (explaining that the explanation "need not rise to the level justifying exercise
of a challenge for cause"). All that is required is an explanation that "does not deny equal
protection." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. ''Unless a discriminatory intent is
8

inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed [ ] neutral/* Id.
This is so because "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding [] motivation rests w ith, and
never shifts from, the opponent of the strike/' Id.A
3.

Proving Purposeful Discrimination,

The final step requires the trial court to decide whether the opponent of the
peremptory challenge has proved purposeful [ ] discrimination/' Higginbothanu 917 P.2d
at 548; accord Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1724. In other words, the trial court must
determine whether the proponent's '"explanation for a peremptory challenge should be
believed.'" State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352,365 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869(1991)). "[T]he question is not whether
the prosecutor's explanation for the strike was factually correct, but whether it was a pretext
to disguise a [discriminatory] motive." Id. at 156; accord Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 549 n.3
(holding that "a peremptory challenge can be made even for a mistaken reason so long as it
is not racially motivated").
4

In Batson, the Supreme Court explained that the proponent of the strike "must
give a 'clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for
exercising the challenges/' Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.20, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n.20. Based
on this language, Utah courts have concluded that the explanation by the proponent of the
strike "must be '(1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably
specific, and (4) legitimate.'" Higginbothanu 917 P.2d at 548 (quoting Cantu II, 7^8 P.2d
at 518). These latter two requirements, however, do not suggest that the explanation be
plausible. As later explained by the Supreme Court in Purkett, were simply "meant to
refute the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely
denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith."
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. In other words, "[w]hat is meant by a
'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal
protection." Id.
9

In this final step, "the persuasiveness of the [proponent's] justification becomes
relevant." Purketu 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. at 1771. As observed by the United States
Supreme Court, "[a]t this stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably
will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination." Id. "'There will seldom be
much evidence bearing on th[is] issue, and the best evidence often will be the demeanor of
the attorney who exercises the challenge."' Id. (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111
S.Ct. at 1869). Accordingly, "[i]n determining whether the peremptory challenge involved
purposeful [ ] discrimination, the trial court must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Cannon, 2002 UT App 18,
at H 13 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Factors that may bear on the credibility of the
explanation offered include "(1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the juror in
question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory examination assuming neither the
trial court nor opposing counsel had questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for special
questioning designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is unrelated to
the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons equally applicable to juror[s] who
were not challenged.'" Bowman, 945 P.2d at 155-56 (quoting Cantu II 778 P.2d at 518-19).
C. The Peremptory Strike of Juror 11 Was Not Discriminatory.
Applying the three-step analysis to the facts here reveals that the trial court correctly
denied defendant's objection to the prosecutor's peremptory strike of Juror 11.

10

1.

Defendant Did Not Establish a Prima Facie Case of Purposeful
Discrimination.

After each party exercised its four peremptory challenges and the jury was sworn,
defendant's counsel raised a Batson objection to the prosecutor's fourth peremptory
challenge against Juror 11, Amador Romero. R. 101:25-26." Counsel pointed out that Juror
11 was the only minority of the sixteen prospective jurors from which the jury would be
selected. R. 101:26. He further argued that because Juror 11 was a minority, he would have
"more sympathy" for his client who came "from a lower socioeconomic environment." R.
101: 26. The prosecutor argued that he was not required to provide an explanation for the
strike, contending that defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination.
R. 101: 26-27. Relying solely on the fact that "Romero'' is a Hispanic surname, the trial
court found that Juror 11 was a minority. R. 101: 27. The court ruled that "given that fact
alone, Counsel's probably entitled to some explanation as to [the prosecutor's] reasons so
[the court] may then determine whether or not. . . it was neutral and not racially charged .
. . ." R. 101: 27. The trial court's conclusion was error.
In the first instance, the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court's finding
that Juror 11 was in fact a minority. As observed by this Court in Bowman, "Utah courts
have never found a Spanish surname alone sufficient to show minority status unless that
minority status was corroborated by the trial court or the jurors themselves, or was
undisputed/' 945 P.2d at 156. The record does not support a finding that Juror 11 was a
:

The portion of the transcript containing defendant's Batson objection and the trial
court's ruling thereon is reproduced in Addendum A.
11

minority. During the voir dire examination, Juror 11 responded to two questions, giving his
name and general background and indicating that he had once served on a jury. See R. 101:
7, 17. Nothing in his responses indicated that he was Hispanic other than his name.
Although defense counsel asserted that Juror 11 "also had a little bit of an accent," the trial
court did not address that claim and the record cannot support it. See R. 101: 27-28.
Moreover, the prosecutor did not concede that Juror 11 was Hispanic, but expressed some
doubt as to that fact. Although the prosecutor recognized that the court could rule otherwise,
he did not concede the point. See R. 101: 26-27 (stating that fc'[i]f the Court finds that Mr.
Romero is a minority"). On these facts, the trial court erred in finding that defendant was a
minority based on his surname alone. See Bowman, 945 P.2d at 156.
Even if the trial court correctly concluded that Juror 11 was a minority, it incorrectly
concluded that Juror 1 Ts minority status alone was sufficient to require an explanation from
the prosecutor. Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have made it clear that *fc[t]he
mere fact that the subject of the peremptory strike is a minority member does not establish
a prima facie case." Colwell, 2000 UT 8, at «| 18; accord Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, at«! 8.
Moreover, defendant did not identify anything else in the record that would support a finding
that the strike was discriminatory. He did not establish a pattern of strikes against minority
jurors. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. As noted by the prosecutor, Juror 11
was in fact the fourth and last prospective juror stricken by him. SeeR. 49; R. 101:27.° Nor
did defendant point to anything in the "prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire

The jury list is reproduced in Addendum B.
12

examination [or] in exercising his challenges" that would support "an inference of
discriminatory purpose." See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Indeed, there was
none. See R. 101: 5-25.
Defendant did make a claim that the peremptory strike of Juror 11 was improper
because as a minority, he would be more sympathetic to his client who came from a "lower
socioeconomic environment." R. 101: 26. This argument in itself reinforces the very kind
of stereotypes that Batson seeks to prevent. As counsel acknowledged, nothing suggested
that Juror 11 came from a lower socioeconomic environment. See R. 101:26. And that fact
should not be inferred by virtue of a juror's minonty status. Moreover, Batson made clear
that k4a defendant has no right to a 'petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his
own race/" Batson, 476 U.S. at 85, 106 S.Ct. at 1717 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 10
Otto 303, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880)). Defendant likewise has no right to a jury composed
in whole or in part of persons of his own socioeconomic background.
In sum, because the trial court incorrectly concluded that defendant had made a prima
facie showing of discrimination, this Court should affirm the conviction below on that
ground. See State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,«j 31, 994 P.2d 1243 (holding that the appellate
court "'may affirm a judgment of a lower court if it is sustainable on any legal ground or
theory apparent on the record").'

Although the prosecutor ultimately explained the reasons for his strike, he did so
only after the court so required. Thus, the State did not waive review of the trial court's
finding on the sufficiency of defendant's prima facie showing. See Higginbothanu 917
P.2d at 547 (holding that "[w]here the proponent of the peremptory challenge fails to
contest the sufficiency of the prima facie case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal
13

2.

The Prosecutor Offered a Neutral Explanation for Striking Juror 11.

Assuming, arguendo, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant had made a
prima facie showing of discrimination, the prosecutor's explanation was neutral.
In response to the Batson challenge, the prosecutor explained:
I felt, your Honor, that this Jury would be better able to deliberate the evidence
that I anticipate presenting to it if it were balanced between men and woman
[sic]. I therefore made efforts to take men off of the Jury. That may not make
a great deal of sense, but that was the game plan. Mr. Romero was a man, I
took him because he was a man and I thought I would be more comfortable
with Ms. Rayburn or Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero on the Jury.
R. 101:27. Defendant thereafter objected to the stnke on the ground that removing a juror
solely on the basis of gender is also impermissible under Batson and its progeny. R. 101:28.
The trial court rejected defendant's argument, concluding that in a "spousal-abuse type of
case," the parties are entitled to strike either gender, depending on which may be more
inclined to adhere to their theory of the case. R. 101:28. Although the trial court incorrectly
concluded that strikes based solely on gender are permissible, the prosecutor's peremptory
strikes were not gender-based.
J.E.B. v. Alabama involved a paternity and child support action brought by the State
on behalf of the mother of a minor child. / £ . # . , 511 U.S. at 129, 114 S.Ct. at 1421-22. The
putative father challenged the State's use of peremptory strikes to remove prospective male
jurors. Id. The State "maintained] that its decision to stnke virtually all the males from the
jury in this case 'may reasonably have been based upon the perception, supported by history,

explanation for the challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie case was established is
waived"); see also State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah App. 1996).
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that men otherwise totally qualified to ^erve upon a jury in any case might be mote
sympathetic and receptive to the arguments of a man alleged in a paternity action to be the
tather of an out-of-wedlock child, while w omen equally qualified to sen e upon a jury might
be more sympathetic and receptiv e to the arguments of the complaining w ltness w ho bore the
child " V £ 5,511 US at 137-38, 114S Ct at 1426 (citations to record omitted) The l^sue
before the United States Supreme Court was "whether peremptory challenges based on
gender stereohpes provide substantial aid to a litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial
jury " Id at 137, 114 S Ct at 1426 (emphasis added) The high court concluded that thev
do not
The Supreme Court held that "[i]ntentional discrimination on the basis of gender by
state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the
discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotvpes
about the relative abilities of men and women" Id at 130-31, 114 S Ct at 1422

In

extending Batson to gender-based strikes, the high court observed that "[a]ll persons, when
granted the opportunity to serve on a jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily
because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns
of historical discnmmation." Id at 141-42, 114 S Ct at 1428 (emphasis added) The court
further explained
The potential for cynicism is particularlv acute in cases where gender-related
issues are prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual harassment, or
paternity Discriminatory use ot peremptory challenges may create the
impression that the judicial system hab acquiesced in suppressing full
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participation by one gender or that the deck has been stacked' in fav or ot one
side

Id at 140, 114 SCt at 1427 Accordingly, contrary to the tnal court's conclusion below, the
parties were not at liberty to strike prospective jurors on the basis of their gender under the
assumption that one gender or another would be sympathetic to their position in a spouse
abuse case However, the prosecutor did not proffer that as a reason for the stnkes of the
men on the jury He asserted instead a desire to achieve a gender-balanced jurv
Less than a handful of jurisdictions have touched on the propriety of exercising
peremptory stnkes to achieve a gender-balanced jury See, e g , United States v Tokars, 95
F 3d 1520 (11th Cir 1996), cert denied, 520 U S 1132, 117 SCt 1282 (1997), People v
Hudson, 745 N E 2d 1246 (111.), cert denied, — U S —, 122 S Ct. 134 (2001), Gattis v
Delaware, 697 A.2d 1174 (Del. 1997), cert denied, 522 U S 1124, 118 S Ct 1070 (1998)
None, however, have squarely addressed the issue, relying instead on "dual motivation"
analysis For example, in Tokars, federal prosecutors argued that they struck men from the
jury to ensure that every sex was represented in the jury

Tokars, 95 F 3d at 1532 The

Eleventh Circuit assumed that the government's preferred reason was discriminatory, but
nevertheless upheld the stnkes because the government offered other gender-neutral reasons
for the stnkes. Id. at 1533. Likewise, the Illinois Supreme Court in Hudson assumes that
exercising peremptory challenges to achieve a gender-balanced jury is improper However,
the court nevertheless recognized that such an explanation is not what concerned the
Supreme Court \nJEB

After explaining J E B s refusal to countenance the assumption
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that "men might be more sympathetic to the putative father in a paternity suit and women
might be more sympathetic to the mother," the Illinois court observed:
It is important to recognize that no such invidious stereotype has been
advanced or suggested in the case at bar. Rather, we are faced with a
statement that, on its face, indicates that the prosecutor was, among other
things, attempting to seat a jury with a diverse character.
Id. at 1254. Indeed, a review of the holding in J.E.B. confirms that a pattern of stnkes to
achieve a gender-balanced jury is not the evil which J.E.B. seeks to prevent.
As noted, the prosecutor here sought a balancedjury of men and women, explaining
that a balanced jury "would be better able to deliberate the evidence." R. 101:27. In seeking
that balance, he did not "ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of men and women" which
J.E.B. sought to prevent. J.E.B.,5\\ U.S. at 140, 114S.Ct.at 1427. Instead, the prosecutor
sought to ensure the very thing that J.E.B. could not—a jury composed of a fair cross-section
of the community. In this regard, the court in J.E.B. observed:
"The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either
criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community . . . . This does not mean, of course,
that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social,
religious, racial, political and geographical groups of the community;
frequently such complete representation would be impossible. But it does
mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without
systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups. . . ."
Id. at 146 n. 19, 114 S.Ct. at 1430 n. 19 (quoting Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 21 ^.
220, 66 S.Ct. 984, 986(1946)). Rather than excluding any particular gender, the prosecutor
was simply attempting to include both genders in a balanced way.
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In striking jurors to achieve a balanced jury, the prosecutor did not pursue a course
of action "reflective of 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations about gender, or based on
'outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females . . . .'" Id. at 135, 114 S.Ct. at
1424-25 (citations omitted). In short, he did not assume, as the trial court incorrectly did, that
individual jurors would "hold particular views simply because of their gender/' Id. at 14142, 114 S.Ct. at 1428 (quoting Strauder, 100 S.Ct. at 308). Rather than sending a message
"to all those in the courtroom . . . that certain individuals, for no reason other than gender,
are presumed unqualified/' the prosecutor sent a message that both genders should
participate. See id. at 142, 114 S.Ct. at 1428. As the supreme court in J.E.B. observed:
"It is said . . . that an all male panel drawn from the various groups within a
community will be as truly representative as if women were included. The
thought is that the factors which tend to influence the action of women are the
same as those which influence the action of men—personality, background,
economic status—and not sex. Yet it is not enough to say that women when
sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to act as a class. Men likewise do not act
like a class . . . . The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community
made up exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both;
the subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the imponderables.
To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given case make an iota of
difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded."
Id. at 133-34, 114S.Ct.at 1424 (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94,67
S.Ct. 261,264(1946)).
Because the prosecutor did not did not exercise his peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner, but rather to achieve the interests espoused in J.E.B., the trial court
correctly concluded that his explanation was gender-neutral.
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3.

The Trial Court Properly Found that the Prosecutor's Reason for
Striking Juror 11 VVas Not Purposefully Discriminatory.

The final inquiry in the equal protection analysis is whether defendant met his burden
in establishing that the prosecutor's strike was purposefully discriminatory.

See

Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. A review of the record reveals that he did not.
The prosecutor did not single out any of the male jurors for "special questioning
designed to evoke a certain response." See Bowman, 945 P.2d at 155-56; R. 101: 5-25. He
expressly sought a balanced jury to decide a highly charged confrontation between a man and
woman. See id. (holding that a reason unrelated to the case shows discriminatory intent).
Moreover, the pattern of strikes confirms an intent to achieve a gender-balanced jury rather
than an intent to exclude all men.
The jury in this case was selected from an initial pool of thirty prospective jurors. See
R. 49-50. That pool was reduced to twenty-nine after the voir dire examination when Juror
8 was excused by stipulation of the parties. See R. 49. Because defendant was being tried
for a third degree felony offense, he was entitled to a jury of eight and the parties were
entitled to four peremptory challenges each. See: Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-5(2) (1996);8
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(e); Utah R. Crim. P. 18(d). The parties were therefore left with jurors
1 through 7 and 9 through 17 from which to exercise their peremptory challenges—ten men

Section 78-46-5 has since been amended, but the amendment did not alter the
number of jurors defendant would have been entitled to. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-465(l)(b)(Supp. 2002).
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and six women. See R. 49. By virtue of their order in the jury pool, jurors 18 through 3n
were necessarily eliminated from jury selection. See R. 49-50.
Before any peremptory challenges, the first eight jurors—and thus the potential
jury—consisted of 6 men and 2 women. See R. 101: 49. The prosecutor exercised his first
peremptory challenge against Juror 5, a male, leaving a potential jury of 5 men and 3 women.
After defendant struck juror 2, a male, the potential jury still consisted of 5 men and 3
women. The prosecutor exercised his second peremptory challenge against Juror 12, a male.
However, that strike did not affect the composition of the potential jury, which still consisted
of 5 men and 3 women. Had he wished to further alter the balance, the prosecutor would
have exercised his strike against jurors 1, 6, 7, 9, or 11—thus achieving a 4-4 split.
Defendant's second peremptory strike against Juror 7, a male, did in fact create a potential
jury evenly split between men and women, 4-4. The prosecutor exercised his third
peremptory strike against juror #14, a male, which again left unaffected the composition of
the potential jury. See R. 101: 49. Defendant's third challenge striking Juror 13, a female,
also left unchanged the jury composition of 4 men and 4 women.
The prosecutor exercised his final peremptory strike against Juror 11, a male, tilting
for the first time the composition of the potential jury in favor of women, 3-5. At that point,
however, the prosecutor was faced with limited possibilities for achieving the 4-4 balance,
all dependent on how defendant would exercise his last peremptory challenge. The final
composition of the jury could have ranged from 5 men and 3 women, 5 women and 3 men,
or 4 men and 4 women. Accordingly, the prosecutor was left to speculate as to which
20

prospective juror would be stricken by defendant.

The defendant exercised his final

peremptory challenge against Juror 17, a male, leaving a final jury composition of 3 men and
5 women.
As the foregoing review of the stakes reveals, the prosecutor did not attempt to weight
the jury with female jurors, but simply attempted to balance the jury. Had he had a
discriminatory intent, he would have stricken the first four eligible male jurors. That course
of action would have created the greatest likelihood of having a predominately female jury.
He did not pursue that course of action. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in
concluding that the prosecutor's stakes were purposefully discriminatory.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
:a<—'
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

(Jury sworn.)
THE COURT:

You may be seated for a moment, folks.

Will you please read the Information?
(Clerk reads Information.)
THE COURT:

Members of the Jury, I will remind you of

an admonition each time we reconvene or recess.
admonition is:

The

Do not discuss this case with anyone.

Do not

allow anyone to discuss it with you or in your presence.

If

anyone attempts to do so, I want you to report it to myself or
the bailiff immediately.
You must not view, listen to, read or otherwise be
exposed to any media report about this trial.

I don't

anticipate there will be any, but you must be cautious about
that.

You must keep an open mind until you have heard all of

the evidence and not be distracted by any outside influences.
I will remind you of that admonition at each recess.
Now, we are going to take a recess, folks, of
approximately 15 minutes.

And we will reconvene when the

i
'
t

Bailiff tells us it's time.

Thank you, folks.

'

(Recess.)
i
i

THE COURT:

We are convened in the instant matter

outside of the presence of the Jury.
Mr. Cope, Mr. O'Connell, you wanted to say something
on the record?
MR. O'CONNELL: Your Honor, I had been concerned
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter
I

about one of the State's challenges, and I wanted to put that
on the record.

It was, I think, Number 11, Amador Romero.

Mr. Romero was the only minority on the Jury, and I understand
my client is not a minority, but I still think that he's
entitled to the benefit — my client comes from a lower
socioeconomic environment, that Mr. Romero does not
necessarily come from that, but as a minority I think he has
more sympathy to that type of thing.

And so I think hefs

still entitled to have him on this jury.
U.S. v. Battson (phonetic) —

And I think under

I forget the —

under the

Supreme Court challenge, I am raising an objection to him
taking out the only minority at least in the first 17 we were
picking from.

He was the only minority and was taken off by

the State.
THE COURT: Mr. Cope, do you wish to state for the
record your rationale for exercising that peremptory that's
being referred to?
MR. COPE:

Your Honor, under Battson (phonetic), my j

understanding is that unless the Court finds that there was
some improper motivation or prima facia case was establish by
the Defense for that, that I will not have to state a reason
for striking Mr. Romero.

If the Court finds that Mr. Romero

was a minority, I believe —

I guess the Court could find

that.
But I note that Mr. Romero was the fourth person
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter

taken by the prosecution, and that -- well, if the Court wants
me to state my reason for taking him rather than —
THE COURT:

Let me say it this way:

Of the initial

17 names from which the Jury was selected, at least as our
procedure goes, it appears to me that the name "Romero" is,
indeed, a Hispanic surname, and I think that given that fact,
alone, Counsel's probably entitled to some explanation as to
your reasons so I may then determine whether or not, in my
estimation, it was neutral and not racially charged so to
speak.
MR. COPE:

I felt, Your Honor, that this Jury would

be better able to deliberate the evidence that I anticipate
presenting to it if it were balanced between men and woman. I
i

therefore made efforts to take men off of the Jury.

That may j
i

not make a great deal of sense, but that was the game plan.
Mr. Romero was a man, I took him because he was a man and I
thought I would be more comfortable with Ms. Rayburn or
Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero on the Jury.
THE COURT:

So, the striking — your peremptory

challenge to Mr. Romero had nothing -- according to your
statement here, had nothing at all to do to the fact that he
has an Hispanic surname?
MR. COPE: Yes.
THE COURT:

Very well.

MR. O'CONNELL:

Your Honor, in response to that:

Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter

Briefly, I think Mr. Romero also had a little bit of an accent
as I recall —
THE COURT:

Excuse me?

MR. O'CONNELL:

Had a little bit of an accent, which

probably wonft show up in the record since this is
transcribed.
My concern, of course, is —
name of the case.

I can't remember the

There was a later Supreme Court case that

extended Battson to gender as well, and it is also
inappropriate for the State to remove somebody solely based
upon their gender.

And taking people off because they are

male or female I think is also inappropriate and in the same
situation as taking off a minority.

So I think either way

that it is an inappropriate choice.
THE COURT:

Well, I am not prepared to state that the

challenge was inappropriate.

It appears to me that there's

been a justification for exercising the challenge against
Mr. Romero.

And moreover I'm not persuaded that in a case of

this nature, specifically a spousal-abuse type of case, that
selecting jurors, be they male or female which the Prosecutor
or Defense for that matter decides might be more inclined to
2 | adhere to the Prosecution's theory of the case or the
Defense's theory, for instance, that that was an inappropriate
way or manner or justification for a challenge; therefore,
your challenge is declined.
Carlton Way, Registered Professional Reporter
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